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And at p. 368 Lord Simonds said:
[the word] 'charitable' . . . is a term of art with a technical meaning

and that is the meaning which the testator must be assumed to have
intended.

On this basis the bequest is a valid charitable gift once translated
as it was by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. The only
other hurdle and, it would seem, one easily cleared, is the Verge v.
Sommerville27 requirement. However, it would seem clear that French
Canadians of a diocese would be a "section of the community."

D.S.F.
H. INSURANCE
Dominion Bridge Company Ltd. & Toronto General Insurance Company, [1963] S.C.R. 326.
A short history of this action will suffice to explain its presence
in the Supreme Court. The trial decision holding the present respondent, Toronto General Insurance Co. liable on a contract of insurance
was reversed in the British Columbia Court of Appeal1 and the appellant, Dominion Bridge Co. Ltd., sought to have the original decision restored.
The facts presented no difficulty and may be summarily stated.
The appellant entered into a contract with a Toll Bridge Authority to
erect the steel superstructure of a bridge and for their own protection
took out a "Contractor's Public Liability Policy" with the respondent.
The relevant provision of this policy was Endorsement No. 1 by
which the respondent undertook:
A. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon Insured
by law for damages because of injury to or destruction of property,
caused by accident occurring within the Policy Period ... and resulting
from or while at or about work or operations of the insured ....

Then followed the Exclusions Clause which read:
This Endorsement shall have no application with respect to and shall

not extend to nor cover any claim arising or existing by reason of any
of the following matters:
(W) Liability or obligation assumed by Insured under any contract or
agreement.
(2) ...

A portion of the bridge collapsed causing considerable damage to
piers which had been erected by the Authority. It was found as a
fact that (1) the appellant had assumed liability in contract for the
damage, and (2) that the appellant was also, by reason of its engineer's
negligence, liable in tort. Dominion sought indemnity from General
but coverage was denied by reason of the exclusionary clause. Dominion argued that the liabilities were distinct and although the exclusion
27

Supra,footnote 22 at p. 499.
1 (1962) 37 W.W.R. 673 reversing (1961) 34 W.W.R. 289.
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clause dispensed with any claim for indemnity for the liability on
the contract, the tort liability was clearly a liability "imposed by law"
and within the insuring Endorsement.
Collins J. at trial accepted this as a logically sound premise in
absence of contrary authority. General cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the The Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Andrews and
George Co. Ltd.2 as governing. They argued that this case decided
that if there is a liability imposed by law, and the said liability is also
assumed under contract, then such an exclusion clause as is here
present is sufficient to exclude liability. This was not accepted, Collins
J. preferring to restrict that decision to its narrow facts:
In my view those reasons were not intended as authority for the principle
that the exclusion of a liability or obligation assumed by insured under
any contract or agreement would relieve the insurer from its own contractual liability under the insuring clause in a policy to indemnify the
insured in respect of payment by reason of liability3 imposed upon the
insured by law for damages independently of contract.

In support of this opinion he turned to a decision by LeBel J.A. in
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Featherstonev. CanadianGeneral Insurance Co.4 LeBel J.A. there reasoned that it was only liability
assumed by contract that was excluded from the risk by the exclusion
clause, and that the Andrews and George case was no authority for the
proposition that where an insurer insures against liability "imposed by
law" it may exclude that very liability in the same policy. General
appealed and was successful in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.
DesBrisay C.J.B.C. specifically disagreed with the learned trial
judge's interpretation of the Andrews and George case.
The reasoning of Sheppard J.A. is particularly relevant. He
considered that the facts of the Andrews and George decision were
sufficiently parallel to the present case that by adopting the Supreme
Court's construction in that case the immediate case was determined
against Dominion. The test is:
(1) Is there a liability "imposed by law" within the coverage?
(2) Is that liability also assumed under contract within the exclusion
clause?
(3) If so, the liability is excluded from the coverage.

He went on to deal with the allegation by Dominion, that the liabilities
were distinct, by pointing out that liability under contract and liability
in tort were really not distinct in these circumstances because both
causes of action arose from the same damage to the piers. This distinction was illustrated by demonstrating that Dominion had satisfied
both claims by repairing the damage. To conclude he stated:
The question in every instance is whether the liability imposed by law
and the liability assumed under the contract are one and the same loss;5
if so, that liability, though imposed by law, is excluded from coverage.
2 [19532
3 (1961)
4 [1959]
5 (1962)

1 S.C.R. 19.
34 W.W.R. at 299.
O.R. 274.
37 W.W.R. at 695.
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The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Judson J. In
dismissing the appeal the reasons of the Court of Appeal were
adopted based as they were on the earlier decision of the Supreme
Court in Andrews and George. The Featherstone case was disapproved. Particular attention it would seem was paid to the holding
by Sheppard J.A. that "liability assumed under contract" and "liability
imposed by law" where for one and the same loss and hence caught
by the exclusion clause. For this reason, though no opinion was expressed, it may be possible in a later case to avoid the present result
when the "same loss" test cannot be applied. R.L.W.

The London Life Insurance Company v. Chase [1963] S.C.R. 267.
The Supreme Court in a rather tragic case was given the opportunity to consider the burden of proof resting on those alleging the
commission of a criminal or quasi-criminal offence in civil proceedings.
The late Robert Leroy Chase, the respondent's husband, was an
apparently normal young man of twenty-three, living in his own home
with his wife and two children and gainfully employed. On the
evening of May 1st, 1959 on returning from a "stag" party he kissed
his wife dozing in the living room and then went in succession from
the bathroom to a storage room in the rear of the house. His wife
heard a noise and on entering the storage room found the deceased
lying prone, a rifle beside him, and with a fatal bullet wound in his
right temple. The appellant Insurance Company disclaimed liability
on a life insurance policy on the deceased's life by reason of an
exclusion clause which read as follows:
In case the life insured shall die by his own hand whether sane or Insane,
within two years from the date on which this policy is issued, the liability
of the company hereunder shall be limited to an amount equal to the
premiums paid on the policy without interest.
The appellant produced the evidence of a qualified expert that
having regard to the nature of the wound, the position of the body
and the character of the rifle, suicide was the only logical explanation
of the death. The trial judge held the Insurance Company had not
satisfied the onus resting on it to prove the commission of suicide
and ordered payment of the proceeds of the policy to the respondent
widow. This judgment was affirmed by a majority of the Manitoba
Court of Appeal.
The appellant brought its appeal to the Supreme Court alleging
that the trial judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal had
misdirected themselves as to the proper standard of proof applicable
to the circumstances. They relied on excerpts from the lower court
judgments as indicating the judges had applied the criminal or even
higher standard of proof.

